Social Computing Based Analysis on Monogamous Marriage Puzzle of Human by Cai, Ning et al.
~ 1 ~ 
Social Computing Based Analysis on 
Monogamous Marriage Puzzle of Human 
 
CAI, Ning1, 2    DIAO, Chen1, 2    YAN, Bo-Han3   LIU, Jin-Hu4 
1 School of Electrical Engineering, Northwest University for Nationalities, Lanzhou, China 
2 Key Laboratory of National Language Intelligent Processing, Gansu Province, China 
3 School of Ethnology and Sociology, Northwest University for Nationalities, Lanzhou, China 
4 People’s Hospital of Linxia Prefecture, Linxia, China 
 
 
 
Abstract: Most of the mammal species hold polygynous mating systems. The majority 
of the marriage systems of mankind were also polygynous over civilized history, 
however, socially imposed monogamy gradually prevails throughout the world. This is 
difficult to understand because those mostly influential in society are themselves 
benefitted from polygyny. Actually, the puzzle of monogamous marriage could be 
explained by a simple mechanism, which lies in the sexual selection dynamics of 
civilized human societies, driven by wealth redistribution. The discussions in this paper 
are mainly based on the approach of social computing, with a combination of both 
experimental and analytical analysis. 
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1. Introduction 
It is estimated that up to 90% mammal species have polygynous mating systems 
[1], including human, in which one male lives and mates with multiple females, 
whereas each female only mates with a single male. This is evidently advantageous 
for facilitating evolution by effective sexual selection.  
In comparison with most of other mammals, where generally any species 
possesses a constant unitary mating system, extensive complexity is manifested in 
human. Nearly all typical modes exist in anthropological records, e.g. monogamy, 
polygyny, polyandry, and promiscuity. Nonetheless, polygyny is still dominant 
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throughout civilizations [2], which also conforms to certain biological signs such as 
the moderate sexual dimorphism in body size [3].  
Despite the above facts, during the recent centuries, socially imposed monogamy 
which is regulated both by laws and ethics gradually prevails all over the world. The 
cause of such a phenomenon seems somewhat abstruse, mainly because those who are 
most influential in establishing laws and shaping norms are exactly the same stratum 
being mostly benefitted from polygyny [4-6]. It is difficult to understand why these 
people voluntarily abandon the privilege in holding more than one wife. Thus, it is 
called a puzzle [4].  
There exist several hypotheses in the literature for the drive of the transition from 
polygyny to socially imposed monogamy, e.g. male power dynamics, technological 
impacts, cultural group selection, pathogen stress, and inclusive fitness [4, 7-11]. 
Recently, Bauch and McElreath [12] proposed a novel hypothesis that monogamy 
surpasses polygyny primarily in reducing the negative effects from sexually 
transmitted bacterial infections.  
 The hypothesis of Bauch and McElreath is theoretically reasonable and 
enlightening, however, it may not always be consistent with the reality. First, although 
agriculture has developed for thousands of years, socially imposed monogamy 
reigned over the world only during the very recent centuries. For instance, polygyny 
was legal before 1880 in Japan, 1953 in China, 1955 in India, and 1963 in Nepal [13]. 
Records can hardly be found to show any sign of correlation between depopulation 
and sexually transmitted infections in these Asian countries. Secondly, mating system 
is different from pair bond marriage system. Even if the monogamous marriage 
system is validly implemented, sexually transmitted infections can still spread via a 
hidden dissimilar mating network, e.g. prostitution.  
In this article, we propose a new hypothesis, which is a simple mechanism to 
explain the monogamous marriage puzzle. We speculate that the de-facto monogamy 
may not be the result of initiative rational choice of any people; instead, it should be 
naturally yielded from the sexual selection dynamics of mankind in civilized societies. 
The key of the mechanism lies in the redistribution of wealth.   
The discussions are mainly based on the approach of social computing, with a 
combination of both empirical and analytical analysis, in which the empirical analysis 
here is rooted within the theoretical framework of parallel systems [14-15]. We study 
the laws of social phenomena by building and observing the behaviors of simulation 
systems. The objective of simulation systems is not for comprehensively and 
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quantitatively mimicking the real society, instead, it could be very conducive to 
drawing conclusions about certain issues qualitatively, especially those negative 
conclusions asserting that something should never occur.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 elaborates the mechanism 
of the monogamous tendency based on an agent-based simulation model. Section 3 
particularly discusses the effect of marriage system to the intensity of the overall 
wealth gap in a society. The impact of sexually transmitted diseases to the population 
is analyzed under different marriage systems in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 presents 
the concluding remarks.   
2. Simple Mechanism to Explain the Puzzle 
 As a society shifted into patriarchal, it must adopt either polygamous or 
monogamous marriage system; meanwhile develop a set of rigorous norms to compel 
women to keep their chastity. This is because a father needs to guarantee the 
authenticity of his parenthood, in order that his property can be inherited by the 
genuine children of his own.  
 The spouse selection in civilized society is generally economy driven. Suppose 
that at an initial stage, the marriage system is polygamous. Polygyny is dependent on 
the intensity of overall wealth gap in a society. Intensive polygyny should be rooted 
on an intensive status of wealth gap. A prerequisite for someone to keep more wives 
should be that he is richer than average. However, having more wives means having 
more children, and accordingly, the inheritance of his property would be diluted since 
it has to be divided into more number of parcels. Such a mechanism could naturally 
suppress the wealth gap and the difference of wife numbers throughout a society, 
correspondingly.  
 Polygyny can effectively limit the accumulation of property through generations 
and suppress the overall status of wealth gap. This is a spontaneous mechanism of 
balance, with dynamic negative feedback. A man who keeps multiple wives enjoys the 
welfare of being advantageous in spreading his genes, but he must also bear the 
punishment of diluting property by inheritance. In this way, the advantage of his 
descendants for competetion in sexual selection is weakened, as compared with 
himself. 
 The mechanism restraining the intensity of polygyny is empirically testified by a 
very simple agent-based model. One will see that the variance of wife number keeps 
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approximating zero, indicating almost de-facto monogamy.  
 The model is discrete-timed, with each iteration representing a generation of 
people. The procedure of the model can be divided into several sections.  
The first section is wealth distribution. The initial wealth distribution among men 
is Gaussian. Assume that initially, the overall wealth gap is relatively higher. This 
might be due to a war just occurred, or some other event that could arouse 
redistribution of social wealth. The serious wealth gap is expressed by randomly 
selecting 10% men to hold additional wealth, with the mathematical expectation many 
times greater than ordinary.  
The second section is marriage, which is the most important section. The number 
of wives of a man is determined by the wealth he holds. Such a relation between the 
quantity of wives and the amount of wealth relative to others is depicted by a function 
in our model, which has several principles:  
1) The function is increasing.  
2) The function will tend to some quasi-saturation if the amount of wealth is 
sufficiently great. The reason is due to both the bounded demand and the limited 
resource. 
3)  The slope of the function is not only less than 1 in general, but also 
decreasing. This analogously accords with the polygyny threshold model [16] 
observed in animals.  
4) The value of the function is 1 as the amount of wealth equals the average. 
According to the above principles, we set the relation function as the following 
form. 
tanh( / ) tanh(1/ ) 1y x                        (1) 
where tanh( )•  is the hyperbolic tangent function; x R  is the ratio of the amount 
of wealth to the average; y R  is the mathematical expectation of wife quantity; 
and , R    are the parameters shaping the curve.  
 The program randomly chooses an unmarried man and assigns him a number of 
wives from the set of unmarried women in the same generation. For this purpose, 
firstly function (1) is computed. Nextly, the idiosyncratic effect due to other factors 
except wealth is reflected by additionally multiplying a noise, which is a Gaussian 
random number with the mathematical expectation being 1. Finally, the rounded result 
is the quantity of his wives. After this, the program randomly chooses another 
unmarried man to assign him wives, similarly following the rules above. Such a 
process is repeated until all the unmarried women are assigned out.    
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Fig. 1. A sample of relation between ratio of wealth to average and mathematical 
expectation of wife quantity  
 
The third section is reproduction. It is rational to set the average fertility of 
women to 3 or 4, representing the quantity of children that could grow up. There are 
different cases in different families. Thus, for each woman, the actual quantity should 
be yielded by multiplying an additional noise, which is a Gaussian random number 
with the mathematical expectation being 1.  
The fourth section is inheritance. Since it is patriarchal society, the wealth of a 
father would be evenly divided and inherited by his sons. This is consistent with the 
very situation in ancient China [17]. In addition, each of the sons will have a career, 
and his life savings by his own should be added, which is also modeled as a Gaussian 
random number. 
For the beginning generation, there are equal numbers of men and women. Then 
the new generations are iteratively reproduced, following the same procedure 
described above. 
We conducted experiments based on the model and observed the results. The 
variance of the wife quantities derived via the following formula 
2
1
( 1)
1
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ii
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q
N




                           (2) 
is taken as the index indicating the intensity of polygyny in the overall society, since 
the mean of wife quantities is always 1. Note that in (2), mN  denotes the population 
of men and iq  denotes the wife quantity of the ith man. The greater this variance, the 
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higher level of polygyny, or in other word, the lower level of monogamy happens. 
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Fig. 2. Variance of wife quantities  
According to the experimental results, a primary conclusion is that in the steady 
state after the first few generations, the intensity of polygyny keeps very low, with the 
variance being close to zero. An example is illustrated in Fig. 2, which also manifests 
an interesting phenomenon in our experiments that ultra high level of monogamy 
usually occurs in the generation being subsequent to any generation bearing very 
serious wealth gap. For a more intuitive perception of such a variance, four typical 
fragments of wife quantities in different generations are extracted from experimental 
results and listed in Tab. 1, each with 30 successive samples. 
 
Tab. 1. Fragments of wife quantities of four generations 
Generation 
sequence 
Fragment of wife quantities 
1 14, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 4, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 1, 5, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 
2 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 2, 1, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 2, 1 
3 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 2, 1, 1, 1, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 2, 1, 1, 1 
4 1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 2, 1, 1, 1, 2, 1, 1, 1, 0 
3. Effect to Wealth Gap 
 The fact that polygyny contributes to supress the overall wealth gap in society can 
also be clearly verified by experimental observations. 
 Fig. 3 illustrates a comparison of overall wealth gaps between polygynous and 
monogamous societies under the current model. Here the intensity of wealth gap is 
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measured by the ratio of standard deviation to average wealth, being expressed as 
2
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                        (3) 
where i  is the amount of wealth held by the ith man, and a  is the average wealth 
over the society. 
0 2 4 6 8 10 12
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
Generation Index
R
a
ti
o
 o
f 
S
ta
n
d
a
rd
 D
e
v
ia
ti
o
n
 t
o
 A
v
e
ra
g
e
 W
e
a
lt
h
Monogamy
Polygyny
 
Fig. 3. Comparison of overall wealth gaps between polygynous and monogamous 
societies 
 One can see that the intensity of wealth gap generally keeps very low and 
relatively stationary in a polygynous society; whereas in contrast, it is significantly 
higher in a society with imposed monogamy. After generations, such a difference 
declines. This may be attributed to the natural tendency of de-facto monogamy.  
4. Effect of Sexually Transmitted Diseases 
Recently, Bauch and McElreath proposed a novel hypothesis in [12]. Based on an 
empirical model, they conjecture that as the scale of community kept on growing after 
the origin of agriculture, the impact of STD on the overall fertility of the polygamists 
became serious; and thereby the monogamists finally dominated in population.  
Actually, a simple analytical analysis can be conducted to help validating and 
clarifying the hypothesis of Bauch and McElreath.  
Suppose that the total population of the kth generation is ( )k , with the 
women/men population being ( ) / 2k ; the baseline birth rate of a woman is denoted 
by  , which is the number of children in her lifetime and can be affected by many 
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factors expressed as multiplicative coefficients; the probability of a married woman to 
be infected by STD from some source outside of family is  , with the corresponding 
probability of a man being  ; the probability of sterility for an infected woman is  ; 
and the average count of wives in a family is q.  
STD restrains the increase of population. It can be analytically explained whether 
or not this effect is intensified by polygyny.  
For simplicity, assume that a man and all his wives will eventually get infected if 
anyone of them is initially infected by STD and becomes infectious. 
Consider the factor attributed to an initially infected husband. An expected birth 
rate of any woman under this factor is 
(1 ) (1 )
(1 )
    
 
  
 
                      (4) 
where   is the baseline birth rate excluding the effect of the current factor. This is 
independent of the count of wives. 
Now consider the factor attributed to an initially infected wife. The expected birth 
rate of any woman under this factor becomes 
(1 ) (1 )[1 (1 ) ]
{1 [(1 ) 1] }
q q
q
    
  
    
   
                 (5) 
where (1 )q  is the probability that none of the wives get infected. The value of (5) 
is negatively correlated to q. Suppose that 0.04   and 0.2  . The relation 
between the coefficient 1 [(1 ) 1]q     and q is illustrated in Fig. 4. 
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Fig. 4. Relation between average wife number q and coefficient to expected birth rate 
1 [(1 ) 1]q    . 0.04   and 0.2  .   
 
 Under the factor of an initially infected wife, the population dynamics are 
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depicted by the following equations: 
( 1) {1 [(1 ) 1] } ( )
2
qk k

         ( 1,2,3...k  )              (6) 
and 
 
1 1( ) ( ) {1 [(1 ) 1] } (1)
2
k q kk

                           (7) 
 The population is an exponential function of time, with the initial difference 
being amplified with time. In this way, the population of monogamous community 
tends to preponderate gradually. Fig. 5 manifests the ratio of monogamous to 
polygamous population i.e.  
11( )
1 [(1 ) 1]
k
q

 

  
 
over generations, where q = 8, 0.04  , and γ = 0.2 & γ = 0.4, respectively. 
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Fig. 5. Ratio of monogamous to polygamous population over generations. 
 
Actually, even the setting of γ = 0.2 reflects rather high level of STD caused 
sterility. From Fig. 5, one can see that although due to STD, the population of 
monogamous community is superior to polygynous, the significance of such an 
effect may still be comparatively minor in reality.  
The most likely cause for a family member to be infected by external STD 
source is extramarital sex. In any human society, the actual mating system is not 
always consistent with the marriage system. There exist hidden extramarital 
relationships such as prostitution. The mechanism analyzed here is compatible 
with this fact. 
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5. Conclusion 
 The current article concentrates on the monogamous marriage puzzle of mankind. 
A simple hypothesis is presented, which is based on an economic perspective. 
According to the hypothesis, the men who possess multiple wives are confronted with 
intensive dilution of their wealth via heritage distribution, because they tend to have 
more children than average people. As a result, the sons are usually less rich than their 
father and thereby it is difficult for them to keep the same amount of wives. The 
numerical simulations on an agent-based model clearly manifest consistency with this 
hypothesis. In the steady state, a very low level of the variance of wife quantity is 
observable, indicating a de-facto monogamy. 
 Due to the mechanism summarized above, the de-facto monogamy is a natural 
tendency for mankind, rather than the rational decision of any group of people. 
Probably, the overall set of moralities, sentiments, or even laws that have been jointly 
molding the monogamous pattern might just be the byproducts generated from an 
adaptation of society to the existing de-facto monogamy.  
 The simulations also implicates that polygyny effectively suppresses the overall 
wealth gap in society. This could partially explain why the situation of wealth gap in 
modern societies is often more serious than history. 
 It is worth mentioning that the mechanism here is merely hypothesis. In fact, the 
monogamous marriage puzzle should still be comprehensively attributed to multiple 
causes, with the mechanism introduced here being a primary factor, so long as it is 
validated by more evidence.  
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Appendix (Matlab Code for Review) 
lamda = 24; 
mu = 30; 
total_generations = 12; 
average_fertility = 3; 
men_population_cur_generation = 100; 
women_population_cur_generation = 100; 
men_population_next_generation = 0; 
women_population_next_generation = 0; 
total_wealth_cur_generation = 0; 
total_wealth_next_generation = 0; 
bMonogamy = 1; 
 
%initialization 
for i=1:20000 
    men_cur_generation(i, 1) = 0; %wealth 
    men_cur_generation(i, 2) = 0; %ratio of wealth to average 
    men_cur_generation(i, 3) = 0; %quantity of wives 
    men_cur_generation(i, 4) = 0; %quantity of sons 
    men_next_generation(i) = 0; 
end 
 
for i=1:men_population_cur_generation 
    men_cur_generation(i, 1) = normrnd(100, 400); %initial wealth 
    dice = rand; 
    if dice<0.1 
        men_cur_generation(i, 1) = men_cur_generation(i, 1)+normrnd(5000, 3000); 
    end 
    men_cur_generation(i, 3) = 0; %initially unmarried 
    men_cur_generation(i, 4) = 0; %initially no children 
    total_wealth_cur_generation = total_wealth_cur_generation+men_cur_generation(i, 1); 
    men_remain_numbers(i) = i; 
end 
 
count = 1; 
while count<total_generations 
 
    for i=1:men_population_cur_generation 
        men_cur_generation(i, 2) = men_cur_generation(i, 
1)/total_wealth_cur_generation*men_population_cur_generation; %ratio of wealth to average 
    end 
 
    %marriage match 
    women_remain = women_population_cur_generation; 
    men_remain = men_population_cur_generation; 
    while women_remain > 0 
        cur_man = round(rand*men_remain); 
        if cur_man == 0 
            cur_man = 1; 
        end 
 
        %current man is unmarried 
        noise = normrnd(1,0.2);  
        if bMonogamy == 0 
            cur_wives = round((lamda*tanh(men_cur_generation(men_remain_numbers(cur_man), 
2)/mu)-lamda*tanh(1/mu)+1)*noise); %expected count of wives for the current man 
        else 
            cur_wives = 1; 
        end 
        if cur_wives<=women_remain && cur_wives>0 %marry 
            men_cur_generation(men_remain_numbers(cur_man), 3) = cur_wives; 
            women_remain = women_remain - cur_wives; 
            %remove from list of unmarried 
            if men_remain>1 
                men_remain = men_remain-1; 
            end 
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            for i = cur_man:men_remain 
                men_remain_numbers(i) = men_remain_numbers(i+1); 
            end 
        end 
    end 
     
    %compute the variance 
    variance(count) = 0; 
    standard_deviation_wealth(count) = 0; 
    average_wealth = total_wealth_cur_generation/men_population_cur_generation; 
    for i=1:men_population_cur_generation 
        variance(count) = variance(count)+(men_cur_generation(i, 3)-1)^2; 
        standard_deviation_wealth(count) = 
standard_deviation_wealth(count)+(men_cur_generation(i, 1)-average_wealth)^2; 
    end 
    variance(count) = variance(count)/(men_population_cur_generation-1); 
    standard_deviation_wealth(count) = 
sqrt(standard_deviation_wealth(count)/(men_population_cur_generation-1))/average_wealth;     
 
    %birth & inheritage 
    cur_young_man = 1; 
    men_population_next_generation = 0; 
    women_population_next_generation = 0; 
    for i=1:men_population_cur_generation 
        %birth 
         noise = normrnd(1,0.3); 
         offspring_num = round(men_cur_generation(i,3)*average_fertility*noise); 
         if offspring_num>0 
             for j=1:offspring_num 
                 dice = randint; 
                 if dice == 0 
                     women_population_next_generation = women_population_next_generation+1; 
                 end 
                 if dice == 1 
                     men_cur_generation(i,4) = men_cur_generation(i,4)+1; 
                     men_population_next_generation = men_population_next_generation+1; 
                 end 
             end 
         end 
         %inheritage 
         if men_cur_generation(i,4)>0 
             for j=1:men_cur_generation(i,4) 
                 men_next_generation(cur_young_man) = 
men_cur_generation(i,1)/men_cur_generation(i,4)+normrnd(10,8); 
                 cur_young_man = cur_young_man+1; 
             end 
         end 
    end 
     
    %death 
    total_wealth_cur_generation = 0; 
    for i=1:men_population_next_generation 
        men_cur_generation(i, 1) = men_next_generation(i); %wealth 
        men_cur_generation(i, 3) = 0; %initially unmarried 
        men_cur_generation(i, 4) = 0; %initially no children 
        total_wealth_cur_generation = total_wealth_cur_generation+men_cur_generation(i, 1); 
        men_remain_numbers(i) = i; 
    end 
    men_population_cur_generation = men_population_next_generation; 
    women_population_cur_generation = women_population_next_generation; 
    count = count+1; 
end 
 
 
 
 
